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Naval Aviation has been known for over half a century as being one of the most 
fascinating professions.  In that time, however, many brave men and women have lost 
their lives for their country and the mission for which they were assigned.  Improvements 
in aircraft and warship design and the development of the Naval Aviation Training and 
Operating Procedures Standards have all played a role in decreasing the overall mishap 
rate of the Navy and Marine Corps.  Although aircrew may always contribute to the 
mishap rate, the Navy has shifted its focus to the aviation maintenance safety climate as a 
possible indicator of a future mishap.  During the last part of the 1990’s the School of 
Aviation Safety developed and implemented a survey, the Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey (MCAS), to assess the maintenance safety climate of Naval Aviation 
squadrons.  Data accumulated over the past six years have allowed for researchers to 
begin reviewing the possible direct relationship between maintainers, their views of their 
squadron’s climate and aviation mishaps.  This thesis examines the construct of squadron 
maintenance safety climate survey and its possible relationship to aviation mishaps.  The 
raw data employed includes MCAS responses from 126,058 maintainers between August 
2000 and August 2005.  This study finds that the MCAS survey construction needs to be 
revised.  The findings indicate that most questions are formulated to focus on the same 
factor.  Since the survey requires reconstruction, the question of whether it can determine 
the likelihood of mishaps was never visited.  Revising the survey based on psychometrics 
may produce more meaningful results and gauge maintenance safety climate based on the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Naval Aviation is inherently dangerous.  Practically every aircraft platform in the 
Navy and Marine Corps inventory has experienced some failure resulting from factors 
such as human error, material failure or maintenance error.  In light of the many safety 
demands and post-mishap reports, the Naval School of Aviation Safety at Naval Air 
Station Pensacola, Florida, developed and implemented two on-line surveys in July 2000.  
These two surveys, the Command Safety Assessment (CSA) survey and the Maintenance 
Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS), were designed to enable the Navy and Marine 
Corps to assess the climate of aviation squadrons across the platform spectrum. 
At the beginning of 2006, the Department of the Navy (DON) released its top five 
objectives, one of which was to “Emphasize Safety, manage risk to improve mission 
effectiveness and to safeguard the people and resources of the Navy-Marine Corps Team” 
(DON, 2006, para. 4).  Three underlying initiatives of this objective include: 
- Improve safety performance across DON to meet Secretary of Defense Strategic 
Planning Guidance to reduce baseline mishap rates by 75% by the end of FY 
2008. 
-  Promulgate and execute the Naval Safety Strategy and Action Plan.   
- Establish a corporate risk management and mitigation strategy and ensure that 
department leaders and managers use risk-based approaches for planning and 
problem solving. 
It is the never ending endeavor of the Navy and Marine Corps to reduce the 
mishap rate to ensure the safety of all its members.  Mishap reduction and risk 
management and mitigation continue to be some of the Navy and Marine Corps main 
objectives. 
On 24 November 2004, the Commander of Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Vice 
Admiral Zortman, released a message remarking on the mishap reduction goals of the 
Navy.  VADM Zortman delineated his plan to further reduce the mishap rate through 
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operational risk management (ORM), intrusive leadership, training, communication, and 
safety climate surveys.  “Mission and safety are directly linked to readiness – keeping our 
people and equipment operational” (Zortman, 2004, para. 6). 
B.   MISHAPS 
OPNAVINST 3750.6R (2001) defines a naval aviation mishap as “an unplanned 
event or series of events, directly involving naval aircraft or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) which results in any of the following:  (1) Damage in the amount of twenty 
thousand dollars or more to naval aircraft or UAV, other aircraft [Department of Defense 
(DOD) or non-DOD], or property (DOD or non-DOD). Property damage includes costs 
to repair or replace facilities, equipment or material, (2) An injury as defined in paragraph 
307 (of OPNAVINST 3750.6R), or (3) Damage incurred as a result of salvage efforts do 
not count as mishap costs on that aircraft or UAV; however, other damage such as 
corrosion or fire that happen while the aircraft is awaiting salvage must be included.”   
Mishaps are delineated along two dimensions: category and severity.  The Navy 
and Marine Corps use the following scheme for tracking mishaps involving a DOD 
aircraft or UAV. 
1.   Mishap Categories 
The category identifies the circumstances surrounding the mishap (i.e., whether it 
happened in the air or on the ground).   These categories are defined by OPNAVINST 
3750.6R (2001) as:  
a. Flight Mishaps (FM) 
This category encompasses those mishaps which result in $20,000 or more 
damage to a DOD aircraft or UAV or the loss of a DOD aircraft or UAV - when intent 
for flight for DOD aircraft or UAV existed at the time of the mishap. Other property 
damage, injury or death is irrelevant to this classification. 
b. Flight-Related Mishaps (FRM).   
Those mishaps which result in less than $20,000 damage to a DOD 
aircraft or UAV - when intent for flight existed at the time of the mishap and, 




c.  Aviation Ground Mishap (AGM). 
Those mishaps in which the intent for flight did not exist but a DOD 
aircraft or UAV was lost, or more than $20,000 damage was sustained by a DOD aircraft 
or UAV, or DOD or non-DOD property was damaged in the amount of $20,000 or more, 
or a reportable injury occurred. 
2. Mishap Severity 
Each mishap is given a mishap severity code expressing how costly the mishap 
was in terms of loss of life, injury or property damage cost.  These severity classes are 
defined by OPNAVINST 3750.6R (2001) as:  
a. Class A Severity. 
A Class A mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or 
aircraft or UAV exceeds $1,000,000, or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing, or any 
fatality or permanent total disability results from the direct involvement of naval aircraft 
or UAV.  Loss of a UAV is not a Class A unless the cost is $1,000,000 or greater.  
b. Class B Severity 
A Class B mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or 
aircraft or UAV is more than $200,000 but less than $1,000,000, or a permanent partial 
disability or the hospitalization of three or more personnel results.  
c. Class C Severity 
A Class C mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or 
aircraft or UAVs is $20,000 or more, but less than $200,000, or an injury requiring five 
or more lost workdays results. 
The resultant label will include one variable from each section (i.e., Class 
A FM or Class C AGM).  Mishap data from the Naval Safety Center show that since 
August 2000 the Navy and Marine Corps have experienced mishaps from all mishap 
categories.    
Numerous factors play a role in mishaps, and the goal is and will always 
be a zero mishap rate.  However, because humans are involved, this may never become 
reality.  Nevertheless, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to strive toward that goal by 
implementing new strategies and programs to identify the hazards associated with 
aviation and control the involved risks.   
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C. SQUADRON SAFETY 
Naval aviation squadrons, which include active and reserve Navy and Marine 
Corps, are normally organized to include a department dedicated to safety.  The officer 
presence in this department typically includes a Safety Officer (SO) as the department 
head, an Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) and a Ground Safety Officer (GSO).  The SO is 
directly responsible for the promotion of safety within the squadron.  The ASO is a 
graduate of the Naval School of Aviation Safety at Naval Air Station Pensacola and 
“act(s) as principal advisor to the commanding officer on all aviation safety matters” 
(OPNAVINST 3750.6R, 2001, chpt 1, p. 23).  He or she is responsible for duties such as 
maintaining the squadron Pre-Mishap Plan, updating Operational Risk Management 
worksheets, conducting climate surveys, reporting and investigating mishaps as they 
occur, and other miscellaneous aviation safety associated duties.  The GSO is responsible 
for ground-related safety matters, such as automobile and personal safety.  The Safety 
Department strives to ensure that safety is emphasized and is viewed by all squadron 
members as paramount, above and beyond the mission in most cases.        
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
It is essential for the Navy and Marine Corps to isolate possible indicators of 
mishaps to decrease the likelihood of further personnel and aircraft losses.  The purpose 
of this study is to determine whether a relationship exists between the safety climate of a 
naval aviation squadron, as measured by the MCAS, and the number and severity of 
mishaps.  Although the MCAS was originally designed as a tool for Commanding 
Officers to assess the maintenance safety climate of their squadrons, it has recently 
become the focus of interest as a possible instrument to indicate the likelihood of a future 
mishap.  Since the MCAS became available via the internet in July 2000, survey data 
have accumulated to provide an initial foundation for analysis.  The goal of this thesis is 
to analyze the mishap data and their potential relationship to a squadron’s safety climate, 
based on average squadron survey item results.  It will attempt to verify whether the 
survey may be used as a valid tool to determine the likelihood of mishaps.  This research 
will first explore MCAS content and construct validity, the variance, reliability and 
correlation of survey items, and the survey’s Model of Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) 
scales and their correlation to each other and to mishaps.  
5 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study focuses on one primary research question and one secondary question.   
1) Can MCAS results indicate the likelihood of aviation mishaps for Naval & 
Marine Corps Aviation squadrons (High Reliability Organizations)?  
2) Are the MOSE scales of the MCAS independent and optimal? [Assess the 
construction of the survey.]  
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The intent of this study is to gain perspective of the survey and its potential to be 
a useful tool in the reduction of mishaps.  This research is a continuation of prior research 
conducted by Baker (1998), Oneto (1999) and Hernandez (2001).  The survey results 
utilized for this research are primarily from Naval and Marine Corps aviation 
maintenance personnel only.  Existing survey data were employed for this study with no 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.      OVERVIEW 
Naval Aviation is considered a high-reliability organization (HRO), or an 
organization that depends on organizational culture to sustain a safe working 
environment in an attempt to keep the mishap numbers at a minimum (Hernandez, 2001).  
A study by Reason (cited in Hernandez, 2001) determined that strong evidence exists that 
an organization’s safety culture impacts maintenance safety.  Operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) is another issue that could possibly impact a unit’s overall safety culture 
and climate.  During increased military presence abroad and wartime events, the 
operational demands of military units increase and therefore the operational tempo of 
these units also increases.  Analysis by Conway and Svenson (cited in Zacharatos, 
Barling, & Iverson, 2005) adds that “safety infractions increase during periods of 
economic growth, presumably because the need for greater production to meet demand 
results in an increase in work pace” (p. 80).  Further studies by Baugher & Roberts and 
Hofman & Stetzer (cited in Zacharatos et al., 2005) show that “when managers feel 
hindered by an unusually heavy workload, safety is compromised” (p. 81).  Pressure to 
perform and complete work on schedule was also a major cause of work-related 
accidents.  “If production is stressed over safety, employees will infer that managers 
consider safety a low priority regardless of what they say about its importance” 
(Erickson, 2006, p. 3). 
B. HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
High reliability organizations (HRO) are those that maintain a superior safety 
record while operating in hazardous settings with high danger and error potential 
(Roberts, 1990).  Naval aviation is considered a high reliability organization due to its 
extremely volatile mission and environments.  Whether maintainers are working on a 
flight line repairing a helicopter or launching jets from a nuclear aircraft carrier, naval 
aviation is very high paced and there is no room for error.  “In such organizations, 
performance reliability rivals productivity as a dominant goal” (Roberts, 1990, p. 102).      
Many researchers compare naval aviation operations to those of similar high 
performing work teams.  Some include “nuclear aircraft carriers, nuclear power 
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generating plants, power grid dispatching centers, air traffic control systems, aircraft 
operations, hospital emergency departments, hostage negotiating teams, fire fighting 
crews, continuous processing firms” (Department of Energy, 2004, para. 2).  These high 
reliability organizations, or high performing work systems, all have many attributes in 
common.  The members of these organizations understand that for their HRO to maintain 
an injury and catastrophe-free environment while operating at the high-reliability level, 
safety during production must be kept as the highest priority.  Systems of checks and 
balances allow for individuals to report safety incidents without fear of reprisal.  Process 
audits, quality control, rewards, risk management, decision-making authority, formal 
procedures, training, redundancy and many other attributes all play key roles in a HROs 
safety and keep the members focused toward a common goal of an injury or incident free 
environment (Department of Energy, 2004).   
C. SAFETY CLIMATE 
1. Culture versus Climate 
Though often used synonymously, culture and climate carry different 
connotations.   It is essential to understand these differences if we are to understand how 
safety plays a role in the organization.  “By culture, we mean the shared values and 
beliefs of an organization commonly described as ‘the way we do things around here’” 
(Stircoff, 2005, p. 2).  Culture is also based on informal rules, and attitudes that affect 
how we interact, perform duties and train (Quessenberry & Boyer, 2004).  These informal 
rules and personal values can influence the developed culture within a squadron, both 
positively and negatively.  Culture can be affected by informal leaders, who may believe 
they have the best of intentions, but do not understand the negative impact of their role.  
“These people permit certain attitudes and rules to exist, by the way they act and by what 
they tolerate” (Quessenberry & Boyer, 2004, para. 3).  Culture is often deeply entrenched 
within an organization; it is long term, is very difficult to change or takes longer to 
change (Stircoff, 2005) and employees are motivated to be safe by top-down 
management (Erickson, 2006).  Edgar Schein (1999) identifies three key aspects of 
culture: it is deep, broad and stable. “It is the sum total of all the shared, taken-for-
granted assumptions that a group has learned throughout its history” (Schein, 1999, p. 
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29).  Mangers must realize that if they want to attempt to change culture elements, they 
are “tackling some of the stablest parts” of the organization (Schein, 1999, p. 26).    
Climate, however, is different from culture.  Although climate is heavily 
influenced by culture and they affect each other, climate is defined as “the prevailing 
influences on a particular area of functioning (such as safety) at a point in time” (Stircoff, 
2005, p. 2).  A key attribute of climate is that it can change easily and quickly.  
Management and leadership stereotypically have a “knee jerk” reaction to a workplace 
injury or mishap.  This reaction could include punishment, non-scheduled training or re-
evaluation of the process during which the incident occurred.  Climate is affected by 
these reactions, which may strengthen the climate, but the change may not last over the 
long term and climate will often return to the way it was before the injury or mishap took 
place (Stircoff, 2005).  Often, the reaction by management will lower morale and cause 
employees to get frustrated and pessimistic with the process in general.  Reaction may 
also hold the person who caused the original incident liable for the extra work and 
training that stemmed from the mishap. 
2. Safety Culture and Climate 
"The term 'Safety Culture' was first introduced in INSAG's (International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group) Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the 
Chernobyl Accident, published by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) as 
Safety Series No.75-INSAG-l in 1986” (IAEA, 1991, pg. 7).  Many organizations tend to 
be reactive to incidents rather than proactive.  The issue with this mindset is that as long 
as management and employees only focus on the symptoms, there will only be temporary 
fixes to the problem.  The cause of the incident is often overlooked and the safety 
incident experienced is all that is typically addressed (Erickson, 2006).  As Reason (cited 
in Ciavarelli & Crowson, 2004, p. 3) stated, “safety is defined and measured more by its 
absence than its presence.”  
On September 11, 1991, Continental Express Flight 2574 experienced an in-flight 
structural breakup and crashed near Eagle Lakes, Texas. According to Meshkati (cited in 
Weigmann, Zhang, Thaden, Sharma, Mitchell, 2002), this accident was considered “the 
most dramatic turning point for ‘safety culture’ in the United States” (p. 4).  The findings 
from this accident brought safety culture to the attention of the U.S. National Summit on 
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Transportation Safety.   Dr. John Lauber, a member of the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) at the time of the accident, suggested a probable cause of the accident as 
“the failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which 
encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance 
procedures” (Weigmann et al., 2002, p. 4).  Safety culture has since become a highly 
regarded topic of discussion and study among aviation safety professionals and culture 
researchers. 
Carillo (2004) identified ten toxins to an organization’s safety culture.  These ten 
are:  meeting deadlines has priorities over safety; management not visible in work areas; 
lack of concern for employee welfare; not keeping commitments; lack of agreement on a 
common direction or standards; poor accountability; poor communication of important 
information; blame fixing, personal attack and retribution are the norm in handling 
conflict; response and follow up to safety concerns is slow or non-existent; and fear in the 
workplace.  Naval aviation squadrons, as high reliability organizations, can not afford to 
allow these negative mindsets to penetrate maintenance operations and must therefore 
mitigate the toxin before they are able to infiltrate the culture.  
In particular, one which can be very detrimental to a naval aviation safety culture 
is the fear of retribution, personal attack and blame fixing.  If an individual feels he or she 
will be reprimanded for an incident that could cause severe injury or disaster, he or she 
normally will not report the safety event and the organization cannot be proactive in 
preventing the possible incident (Weigmann et al., 2002).  Naval Aviation strives to 
conquer this mindset.  There are programs in place at commands that allow maintainers 
to submit unsafe practices that may relate to safety culture or climate.  One such program, 
called “Anymouse,” which is a play on the word anonymous, allows squadron members 
to report such incidents.  As the squadron leadership receives these inputs, they are 
addressed at the appropriate level.  The command can then assess the issue as a current 
climate issue or an underlying culture issue.  Although this program is in place, it is 
difficult to say if the fear of retribution still exists since the cultural mindsets run deep 
and may be hard to assess. 
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Zohar refers to safety climate as “the shared perception of the people in an 
organization that their leaders are genuinely committed to safety of operations, and have 
taken appropriate measures to communicate safety standards and procedures” (cited in 
Ciavarelli & Crowson, 2004, p. 2).  Safety climate is at the heart of naval aviation 
maintenance safety.  How management and leaders perceive and contribute to the 
squadron’s commitment to safety has a significant impact on how safety is viewed by 
maintenance personnel.  This attribute of safety climate, the commitment to safety at all 
levels, especially management and leadership, supports the reality “that an organization’s 
safety climate does influence injuries and safety-related events” (cited in Evans, Michael, 
Wiedenbeck & Ray, 2005, p. 23).  Kelly asserts that “whatever management permits, 
management condones.  For example, if management allows employees to compromise 
their safety then the unsafe behaviors, in many cases, become routine and may eventually 
lead to a mishap, injury or fatality” (cited in Evans et al., 2005, p. 24). 
Three distinct differences that set safety climate apart from safety culture are that 
safety climate is:  “1) a psychological phenomenon, which is usually defined by as the 
perceptions of the state of safety at a particular time, 2) closely concerned with intangible 
issues such as situational and environmental factors, and 3) a temporal phenomenon, a 
‘snap shot’ of safety culture, relatively unstable and subject to change” (Weigmann et al, 
2002, p. 9).  Differences in safety climate and safety culture at naval aviation commands 
may be a significant factor in identifying unsafe safety attitudes and behavior (Ciavarelli 
& Crowson, 2004).  A weaker safety climate may be indicative of a climate in which the 
managers and leaders only view safety as an artificial priority and not true value (Evans 
et al., 2005).  If commands want a strong safety climate, they must be proactive with their 
management and insist the leadership is leading by example.  Management should expect 
safe behavior from their subordinates and, collectively, they should align with a strong 
safety climate and underlying safety culture.   
3. Safety Climate and Safety Performance 
Research by Evans et al. (2005) within the wood manufacturing industry studied 
the relationship between safety climate, quality climate and productivity climate and their 
effect on safety performance.  Noronha (cited in Evans et al., 2005, p. 24), defines quality 
climate as “employees’ perception regarding the quality objectives of the organization,” 
12 
meaning if an employee perceives the quality climate to be high, production rates would 
be slower and perhaps the organization would have fewer accidents.  In naval aviation 
maintenance, quality climate may be a contributor to the safety climate in that quality and 
safety are stressed, but productivity and fast aircraft turn-around are essential to the 
squadron’s success.  Therefore, productivity climate becomes a factor. This is a term 
defined as “employees’ attitudes and beliefs with respect to management’s emphasis on 
production in the work environment” (Evans et al., 2005, p. 24).  This team found that 
although there is no known research on productivity climate and its direct relationship to 
safety, a study by Hoffman and Stetzer (cited Evans et al., 2005) supports a positive 
relationship between performance pressure and safety performance.       
D. MAINTENANCE CLIMATE ASSESSMENT SURVEY (MCAS) 
1. MCAS Overview  
In July 2000, the MCAS became available online for Naval and Marine Corps 
squadrons.  Since its inception in the late 1990’s, the MCAS has been presented as a 
prominent tool for Commanding Officers to gauge the maintenance safety climate of their 
squadrons.  Originally, the survey was voluntary for all aviation squadrons, though highly 
recommended to be completed by all squadrons on a reoccurring basis.  The concept 
behind the survey is to take a “snap shot” of the safety climate of a particular command 
and allow the Commanding Officer to address issues that could possibly lead to injury or 
mishaps.  Since the timing of safety assessments in naval aviation squadrons is critical, 
Commanding Officers need current survey data to set initial standards for their command.  
In 2004, VADM Zortman declared the MCAS and CSA mandatory for all squadrons to 
complete semi-annually and within 30 days following a change of command (Zortman, 
2004)   
The results shall be made available to your CAG and Commodore, giving 
all a baseline for the new CO.  This plan will remove the ‘report card’ 
aspect of compromising confidentiality, allow the (Commodore) to help if 
necessary, and establish an environment where seeking help is seen as a 
positive.  My intent is for us to evolve these important tools into vehicles 
for visibility, not accountability or attribution.  Additionally, all unit 
commanders shall review their progress with their CAG or Commodore 
six months after the change of command surveys are complete.  This 
allows for the new CO’s plans for intervention and action to begin taking 
effect but does not wait too long for adjustment (Zortman, 2004, para. 2). 
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The MCAS was developed in response to the criticism that little to no attention 
has been paid to the effects of organizational influences on safety and “even less attention 
has been spent on maintainers and maintenance error, despite their involvement in FM’s” 
(Ciavarelli, Figlock, Schmidt, & Sengupta, n.d., p. 1).  The Naval School of Aviation 
Safety tailored the Model of Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) and identified 
five main categories, and a sixth one added later, that may influence how Naval Aviation 
maintenance departments conduct operations (categories are labeled as they are on the 
current MCAS): 
-  Process Auditing (PA):  A system of ongoing checks to identify hazards and 
correct safety problems. 
-  Reward System & Safety Culture (RS/SC):  The expected social rewards and 
disciplinary actions used to reinforce safe behavior, and correct unsafe behavior. 
-  Quality Assurance (QA):  The policies and procedures for promoting high 
quality work performance. 
-  Risk Management (RM):  A systematic process used to identify hazards and 
control operational risk. 
-  Command and Control (CC):  The organization’s overall safety climate, 
leadership effectiveness, and the policies and procedures used in the management of 
flight operations and safety. 
-  Communication/Functional Relationships (C/FR):  An environment where 
information is freely exchanged, quality assurance is a positive influence, and 
maintenance workers are shielded from external pressures to complete a task.   
As of 30 August 2005, hundreds of aviation squadrons and thousands of 
personnel in the Navy and Marine Corps had participated in the MCAS.  Many had taken 
the survey repeatedly over the five year period since the survey was released via internet 
in July 2000. The survey currently consists of 45 survey items.  Of these, 43 are 
statements offering responses along a 5-point Likert Scale with answers ranging from 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  The respondents may also answer “Don’t 
Know” and “Not Applicable.” Furthermore, all 43 survey items must be answered before 
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the survey may be submitted. The remaining two questions are essay and optional, but the 
respondent must select “No comment” or “My response is:” for the survey to be 
accepted.   Each question on the survey has its applicable MOSE category in parenthesis 
following the query to identify the scale for which the specific query belongs.   
Demographic information is gathered at the beginning of the survey.  This 
information consists of rank, years of aviation maintenance experience, work center, 
primary shift, current model aircraft, status, service, parent command, and unit’s location.  
Before the MCAS was initialized on the internet, the survey was provided to squadrons in 
paper form.  In this format, there was an explicit statement indicating the information was 
collected solely to aid in response analysis and no attempts to identify individuals would 
be made.  The current internet version says only that no demographic information will be 
made available to the Commanding Officer.  It is not made clear now to the survey taker 
what this information is used for and may be viewed by some participants as unnecessary 
information.   
In conjunction with the maintenance safety climate surveys, a squadron’s 
Commanding Officer may request a Culture Workshop from the Naval Safety Center 
(NSC).  As another tool for the Commanding Officer to use in the effort of gauging their 
squadron’s safety climate, the Culture Workshop requires the MCAS be completed prior 
to the workshop.  Since they are used in conjunction, this requirement is for the benefit of 
the Commanding Officer and can be included in the overall assessment of the command’s 
culture.  The command conducting the culture workshop invites a pilot or Naval Flight 
Officer (NFO) and a senior maintainer (E-7/E-8), both preferably from outside the 
hosting command, to assist the NSC facilitator.  Informal interviews and interactive 
discussion groups are held to determine how the squadron members view culture in their 
command. 
A study conducted by Quessenberry and Boyer (2004) shows the results of how a 
culture workshop may affect a command’s climate.  They relate squadrons who 
conducted Culture Workshops to a lower mishap rate for that group.  As shown in the 
first two columns of Figure 1, 67 of the Class A FM within the prior two years of their 
study were experienced by the 172 squadrons who had not conducted a Culture 
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Workshop.  Some 99 Squadrons had conducted a workshop and experienced only 5 of the 
72 total Class A flight mishaps.  In January 2003, the Commander of Naval Air Forces 
made it mandatory for all deployable units to conduct a Culture Workshop during their 
inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) and non-deployable units to conduct a workshop 
every two years (Quessenberry & Boyer, 2004).  The workshops bring safety related 
issues to commanding officers’ attention and they can therefore be addressed and 
possibly remedied.  The workshops themselves may not directly prevent mishaps, but 
they can identify safety areas in which the command needs to focus.  The end state was 
for all aviation units to complete a MCAS and Culture Workshop in an effort to gauge 
























Culture Workshops and Class A Mishaps
 
Figure 1. Culture Workshops and Class A Mishaps  
(Quessenberry & Boyer, 2004) 
 
In conjunction with Naval School of Aviation Safety, Baker (1998) developed the 
MCAS from the CSA and determined the questions to be asked on the survey.  His 
results concluded that by using 35 line item inquiries, an adequate assessment of naval 
reserve maintenance safety perceptions can be made.  He recommended it be evaluated at 
active duty squadrons.  Oneto (1999) further researched the MCAS and revised Baker’s 
findings to include an additional 5 questions.  Stanley (2000) reviewed the impact of 
demographic information on survey results.  Individual or group demographics, such as 
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work shift, may have an impact on attitudes, behavior and overall view of maintenance 
safety climate by certain teams (Figlock & Schimpf, 2006).  Focus on these groups may 
be a potential indicator or predictor of mishaps.  Though there may be large amounts of 
variance in the scoring due to human component dependence, this variance cannot be 
explained solely by demographic factors (Stanley, 2000).  Hernandez (2001) addressed 
questions regarding the difference between the internet and the paper-and-pencil version.  
Her results showed that there were no differences and both were equally effective at 
capturing the maintenance safety perception.  Her principal component analysis showed 
that no specific MOSE category question was responsible for controlling the outcome of 
the survey.  All questions loaded on one main component factor, meaning that all 
questions are fairly similar in content and mainly relate to that one factor.  No known 
prior thesis research has been conducted to determine the predictive ability of the MCAS 
and the MOSE category scales relative to climate and aviation mishaps.  There may be 
concern over the design of the survey due to a possible lack of discrimination between 
the questions and within the categories due to factor analysis conducted by numerous 
researchers.  For a survey to be useful, it must measure what it was intended to measure.  
An instantaneous picture of a naval aviation squadron’s safety climate is the primary 
objective of the MCAS.  This research will determine if the MCAS is measuring what it 
was originally developed to quantify and if so, whether the results can give insight and 
forewarning of a possible mishap. 
2. General Survey Construction and Administration 
Survey construction and administration are vital for an instrument to be valid and 
reliable.  Construct and content validity must be proven before a survey instrument may 
be utilized as a tool to gauge or evaluate what it was intended to assess in the way its 
meant to be measured.  “A measure is content valid when its items are judged to 
accurately reflect the domain of the construct as defined conceptually” (Schwab, 1999, p. 
39).  Validating the content of a survey is required to ensure the questions are defining 
factors for which it was designed.  These factors should be specific and separate.  In the 
case of the MCAS, these factors are the six MOSE categories.  Each category division, or 
scale, within the MCAS has between six and nine questions that define it.  Therefore 
content validity, along with factor analysis, should yield six distinct categories. 
17 
a. Construction 
Factor analysis is the primary vehicle for researchers to verify if a tool has 
construct validity.  It analyzes the interdependence of questions, variables or scales and to 
understand the underlying relationships between them then combines groups of like items 
into new and fewer groups (Aaker, Kumar, & Day, 2004).  Principal component analysis 
has been the primary factor analysis method for summarizing this information based on 
the total amount of variance, but principal axis factor analysis has recently become more 
visible for summarizing the data.  Principal axis analysis does not analyze based on total 
variance, instead it focuses only the factors which account for the most variance 
(Wuensch, 2004).        
Since, by definition, HROs have a low rate of accidents, it is difficult to 
forecast and determine whether the safety climate will have a direct impact on the 
occurrence of a mishap or injury.  Low base rate behavior or rare events are very difficult 
to predict.  It can be said that since there are already few mishaps in Naval Aviation, 
there is not much for which the MCAS can determine the likelihood.  However, if we 
were to employ a psychometric perspective, we may be able to improve the survey and 
thereby possibly predict a mishap-prone safety environment.  Climate is elusive; it is a 
latent construct.  It is “seen” through perceptions of individuals and in order to gauge a 
climate, survey developers may need to include psychometric evaluation.  Psychometrics 
is defined as “a branch of psychology concerned with the measurement of psychological 
characteristics, especially intelligence, abilities, personality, and mood states. 
Psychometric tests are carefully constructed and standardized to provide measures of the 
highest possible reliability and validity” (Crystal Reference Encyclopedia, 2006).  It is 
the branch of survey research that allows survey designers to determine if the survey 
instrument measures what it was intended to measure (Litwin, 2003).  Thus, a 
psychometric assessment of MCAS is appropriate to determine the extent to which 
the safety climate of a naval aviation squadron  is being accurately measured and hence 
providing value to the aviation community by promoting an understanding of the 





Administration of the survey can influence the results.  Ethical issues and 
federal law protects individuals from invasion of privacy and personal rights.  If accurate 
information is the goal, survey designers must “give respondents the opportunity to not 
respond and create conditions which encourage them to respond, despite possible 
apprehension, by protecting their privacy” (Watson, 1997, p. 92).  It is difficult to 
ascertain if naval aviation maintenance personnel feel they are participating in the survey 
willingly, honestly or confidentially.  As mentioned, VADM Zortman mandated that the 
survey be taken by all squadrons and the results made available to the Commodore of 
each squadron’s respective wing.  With this in mind, the Commanding Officer of a 
squadron may therefore require each person in his or her squadron to take the survey.  If 
the Commanding Officer orders each individual to take the survey, it is no longer 
voluntary and this may cause the results to be biased or skewed.   
E. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management has been the focus of the Navy and Marine Corps for several 
years and is one of the Navy’s 2006 Objectives.  In a 2001 review of the MCAS, 
Hernandez (p. 45) found that risk management is one specific category that “should be 
reviewed by all Naval Aviation units since this area consistently is ranked the lowest of 
the six MOSE areas.”   
In his 2004 review of mishap reduction strategies, VADM Zortman delineated 
that “attaining our mishap reduction goals requires embracing a safety culture rooted in 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) and a ‘zero mishap mentality’” (para. 1).  ORM is 
a program developed by the Department of the Army in the 1990’s and was quickly 
adopted by the Navy and Marine Corps.  ORM is defined by OPNAVINST 3500.39B 
(2004) as the process of dealing with risk associated within military operations, which 
includes risk assessment, risk decision making and implementation of effective risk 
controls.   
There are five steps to the ORM process:  Identify Hazards, Assess the Hazards, 
Make Risk Decisions, Implement Controls and Supervise.  This formal process is 
typically the documented version of deliberate or in-depth planning conducted by leaders 
and managers to evaluate a procedure or mission.  Most ORM conducted by maintainers 
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and non-operational planning personnel is considered time-critical or “on the run” ORM.  
This level does not require lengthy, drawn out preparation, but uses requisite knowledge 
and experience to make the proper risk management decision.  OPNAVINST 3500.39B 
(2004, Encl 1, p. 3) describes time-critical ORM as follows: 
An ‘on the run’ mental or oral review of the situation using the five step 
process without recording the information on paper. The time critical level 
of ORM is employed by experienced personnel to consider risk while 
making decisions in a time-compressed situation. It is the normal level of 
ORM used during the execution phase of training or operations, as well as 
in planning during crisis response scenarios. It is particularly helpful in 
choosing the appropriate course of action when an unplanned event occurs 
during the execution of a planned operation or daily routine. 
General George S. Patton once said, “Take calculated risks. That is quite different 
from being rash” (Cook, 1997, p. 397).  ORM has adopted four main principles in which 
the Navy expects all its personnel manage their every day tasks and duties.  These are: 
- Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Cost. 
- Accept No Unnecessary Risk 
- Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning 
- Make Risk Decisions at the Right Level 
The difficulty with risk management is that some may feel that there may never 
be a time when the benefit outweighs the cost of a possible mishap.  Whenever people are 
involved in an evolution, maintenance or airborne, there is always a possibility that a 
disaster might occur.  If people allow this mentality to govern their behavior, the mission 
or task may never be attempted or completed.  This is not the intent of ORM.  ORM 
simply implies that if all procedures are followed correctly, safety is aligned as a priority 
in task completion and calculated risk management is effectively employed, a mishap is 
unlikely to occur.  Vincent van Gogh once said “The fishermen know that the sea is 
dangerous and the storm terrible, but they have never found these dangers sufficient 
reason for remaining ashore” (Cook, 1997, p. 394).  If we do not take risk in naval 
aviation, we will not succeed in our missions, training or war efforts.  Risk must be 
managed and mitigated, but likely can not be avoided completely. 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
High reliability organizations have a troubling responsibility to the public to 
ensure that they incur minimal mishaps.  It is the goal of the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps to ensure that the aviators, maintainers and any other personnel involved in 
aviation related activities are safe from injury.  The cost of losing or damaging an 
aircraft, UAV or other aviation asset is a price incurred by the American people, and 
should therefore be minimized whenever possible.  With the human component involved, 
it may be impossible to be mishap free.  By identifying and improving weak or poor 
safety climates, the Navy will be more prepared in its endeavor to minimize the mishap 
rate.  
Currently, the MCAS is the primary tool by which the Navy gauges the safety 
climate of individual squadrons.  By analyzing the survey results, Commanding Officers 
can identify the weak areas within their commands and employ sound measures in an 
effort to improve the current climate.  By establishing a culture in which good time-
critical ORM is reinforced, people will make more informed and possibly wiser 
decisions.  ORM is a valuable tool which when used correctly, could make a huge impact 
on the climate and entrenched culture of an aviation squadron.  With a firm grasp of 
ORM through training and reinforcement from the chain of command, maintenance 
members will feel empowered to make sensible risk management judgments and thus, 
create a safer maintenance environment. 
In conjunction with sound ORM, MCAS results and improving safety climate, 
Naval Aviation squadrons can improve or dramatically reduce the over all mishap rate.  
Reviewing the construction of the survey will verify the validity of the MCAS as an 
instrument to assess safety climate and further, determine the likelihood of mishaps. 





A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The intent of this study is to determine whether the Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey (MCAS) is a suitable tool for determining the likelihood of mishaps 
for Naval Aviation squadrons.    The study employs MCAS data from hundreds of active 
duty and reserve Navy and Marine Corps squadrons from 21 August 2000 through 30 
August 2005.  The MCAS data are first examined to verify the validity of the survey as 
an instrument to assess the safety climate of aviation squadrons.  The MOSE categories 
were examined to determine whether or not they address those areas for which they were 
intended.  The study includes a thorough extraction through principal component and 
principal axis factoring analysis, analysis of variance, and correlation and discrimination 
of survey items and MOSE categories (scales).  Demographics were not utilized.   
B. DATA COLLECTION 
1. Subjects 
Since the inception of the survey in 2000, hundreds of active duty and reserve 
Navy and Marine Corps squadrons (ashore and afloat) and thousands of personnel have 
participated in the MCAS.  This analysis reviews the results of 126,058 respondents from 
952 cases and the mishaps that may have occurred subsequent to those cases.  A case 
refers to a specific completed survey by a squadron. The participants are primarily Navy 
and Marine Corps enlisted personnel involved in maintenance activities in the 952 cases.  
Maintenance safety climate survey results from a mixture of fixed and rotary wing, fleet 
and training squadrons are studied.   All current and recently retired airframes within the 
Navy and Marine Air elements of Naval Aviation are included.  Shore maintenance 
facilities are not incorporated in this research.     
2. Instrument 
The MCAS is an internet based survey through the NSC Naval School of 
Aviation Safety website (https://www.cnet.navy.mil/nascweb/sas/index.htm).  It is self-
administered and mandatory for all Naval Aviation squadrons to participate.  Although 
the survey was originally voluntary, the Chief of Naval Air Forces (CNAF) has mandated 
all squadrons complete the surveys semi-annually and within 30-days following a change 
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of command.  Commanding Officers of participating squadrons determine how many 
command maintenance members take a survey then request the appropriate amount of ID 
numbers required.  The MCAS has two principal sections of questions - demographic and 
climate perception.  Demographics are not utilized in this research since there are 
conflicting results with regard to some demographic items and do not pertain to this 
analysis.  The MCAS consists of 45 survey items.  Of these, 43 are statements offering 
responses along a 5-point Likert scale:  5 - Strongly Agree, 4 - Agree, 3 - Neutral, 2 - 
Disagree, and 1 - Strongly Disagree.  Don’t Know and Not Applicable response options 
are also available, but are not included as part of this research.  The 43 survey items are 
sequential, but are grouped within their MOSE category:  Process Auditing (PA), System 
& Safety Culture (RS/SC), Quality Assurance (QA), Risk Management (RM), Command 
and Control (CC), and Communication/Functional Relationships (C/FR).  The last two 
questions are essay, or qualitative in nature, and will also not be utilized in this research.  
MCAS question 21 – “Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect 
maintenance” is a reverse ordered, or negatively phrased, question and has been deleted 
from the analysis.  See Appendix A for a full list of MCAS questions. 
3. Procedure 
The process of administering and taking the survey is fairly simple and user-
friendly.  When a squadron wishes to conduct a MCAS, the CO, SO or ASO contacts an 
agent of the Naval Safety Center and is assigned a bank of survey ID numbers.  These ID 
numbers are specific to that squadron - one number provided for each individual taking 
the survey.  These numbers are drawn at random by each participant after which the 
member is directed to the website to complete the survey. Typically, the participants are 
requested to take the survey in the Safety Department, since a representative is present to 
answer any questions and ensure each member who takes a number participates in the 
survey.  Once complete, the survey number is discarded and not utilized again.       
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Data Tabulation 
Aggregate survey data are in Excel spreadsheet format with each row representing 
one MCAS case.  The demographic information is presented first as well as the date each 
squadron finished the MCAS.  Following the squadron demographic data are columns 
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containing the case average score for each of the 43 survey items on the MCAS, as well 
as a column dedicated to the response average for that squadron.  Next are six columns 
for the average response scores of questions in their respective MOSE category.  These 
six columns are averages of subsets of the 43 MCAS questions aggregated for the 
spreadsheet.  The next set of columns is the mishap data based on category and severity 
of mishaps split into time blocks of 6-month increments from 6-months post-survey out 
to 30-month post-survey.  Data were then transferred to SPSS v12.0 for analysis and 
interpretation.   
Raw survey data are utilized to verify the validity of the MCAS as a climate 
assessment tool.  The data were presented in two Excel spreadsheets, due to the number 
of data included.  The data were then transferred to SPSS v12.0 for analysis and 
interpretation. 
2. Statistical Analysis 
a. Aggregate Data 
Principal axis factor analysis was utilized for aggregate data analysis.  
After reviewing the preliminary results of the aggregate data, the raw data were requested 
to substantiate the findings.                
b. Raw Data 
Raw data were requested based on the preliminary results of the aggregate 
data analysis. Once the 126,058 respondent data were imported into SPSS v12.0, 
summary descriptive statistics were computed for all respondents.  Simple descriptive 
statistics were developed to gain perspective of the survey data and the individuals taking 
the survey.  Principal component and principal axis factor analysis were employed to 
determine survey factors.  These factors should be based on the six discrete factors based 
on MOSE scales.  This factor analysis determines if the MCAS is indeed measuring 
safety climate based on the six distinct categories.  After factor analysis completion of the 
raw data, the results provide a basis for conclusions of the MCAS survey content and 

























A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Frequencies were analyzed for all questions and demographic items to establish 
an overall feel for the survey results and its contents.  Descriptive statistic results can be 
found in Appendix B.    
B. FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Table 1 shows the content of the MCAS by rationally-derived MOSE theoretical 
categories.  The MCAS was designed to examine six distinct dimensions (as indicated in 
the left column) each consisting of six to nine items (as indicated in the right column).  
An exploratory principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed using 
SPSS to empirically assess the dimensions of the MCAS.  Three factors with Eigen 
values greater than 1 were extracted accounting for 53.82% of the variance.   
 
Table 1. MCAS Questions by MOSE Category 
MOSE Category MCAS Question 
Process Auditing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Reward System and Safety Culture 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 
Quality Assurance 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 
Risk Management 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 
Command and Control 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 
Communication/Functional Relationships 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 
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Table 2. Total Variance Explained by Principal Axis Factor Analysis of MCAS 
 
Factor Initial Eigen values 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 













1 21.075 50.178 50.178 20.623 49.103 49.103 11.166 26.586 26.586
2 1.745 4.156 54.334 1.277 3.040 52.144 8.736 20.800 47.386
3 1.125 2.679 57.013 .704 1.677 53.820 2.702 6.434 53.820
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
The Scree Plot (See Figure 2), which summarizes results, indicates that, before 
rotation, only one factor is substantive in accounting for MCAS contents, accounting for 
almost 50% of the variance.  Upon rotation, a second factor emerges with considerable 
variance.  However, despite varimax rotation, there is no clear differentiation between 
factors.  Thus, the MCAS would seem to comprise only one dimension, rather than the 
six it claims. The pattern of rotated loadings suggests the presence of two diffuse factors; 
the first consisting of overall command attention to safety and the second related to 
workload and appropriate resources.   














Figure 2. Scree Plot of MCAS Principal Axis Factor Analysis 
27 
Table 3. Principal Axis Factor Matrix 
Unrotated Factor Matrix(a)    
  Factor Factor Factor
 1 2 3
CC 34. In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance 
operations and all are responsible/accountable for safety. 0.807     
CC 32. Supervisors communicate command safety goals and 
are actively engaged in the safety program. 0.801     
CC 36. All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, 
supervised and staffed by qualified personnel. 0.787     
CC 35. Safety education and training are comprehensive and 
effective. 0.783     
RM 22. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional 
training/support is provided as needed. 0.781     
CC 33. Supervisors set the example for following maintenance 
standards and ensure compliance. 0.779     
C/FR 43. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards 
associated with maintenance activities. 0.773     
RM 23. Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage 
hazards associated with maintenance and the flight-line. 0.767     
C/FR 39. I get all the information I need to do my job safely. 0.766     
QA 16. QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as 
essential to mission accomplishment. 0.759     
CC 31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work 
center supervisor decisions are respected. 0.758     
RS/SC 7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. 0.755     
RM 26. Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance 
than the flight schedule, and do not permit cutting corners. 0.744     
QA 15. The command has a reputation for quality maintenance 
and set standards to maintain quality control. 0.730     
C/FR 40. Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with 
other work centers and maintenance. 0.726     
QA 17. QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete 
and are not pressured by supervisors to sign off. 0.722     
C/FR 38. Effective communication exists up/down the chain of 
command. 0.721 0.298   
CC 37. Maintenance Control is effective in managing all 
maintenance activities. 0.717     
QA 18. Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as 
that at home station. 0.709     
PA 3. The command uses safety and medical staff to 
identify/manage personnel at risk. 0.704     
PA 6. Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously. 0.703     
RM 28. Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures 
and are aware of individual workload. 0.699     
28 
PA 1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety 
procedures. 0.693 -0.269   
PA 2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has 
a program that targets training deficiencies. 0.691     
RM 24. I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to 
accomplish my job. 0.683 0.306   
RS/SC 14. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the 
command. 0.683     
C/FR 41. My command has effective pass-down between shifts. 0.681     
RS/SC 13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. 0.679     
PA 5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely 
monitored. 0.667     
RS/SC 10. Violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are 
not common in this command. 0.664     
QA 20. QARs are helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my unit. 0.663     
RS/SC 12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors 
about personal problems/illness. 0.657     
QA 19. Required publications/tools/equipment are available, 
current/serviceable and used. 0.650     
PA 4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. 0.647 -0.334   
RM 25. Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the 
command's ability to operate safely. 0.635     
RS/SC 11. The command recognizes individual safety 
achievement through rewards and incentives. 0.604     
C/FR 42. Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes 
before flight. 0.601     
RS/SC 8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other 
procedure violations and encourage reporting safety concerns 0.596   0.437
RS/SC 9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other 
violations and individuals feel free to report them. 0.593   0.505
RM 29. Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is 
not over-committed. 0.586 0.395   
CC 30. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are 
having problems. 0.577     
RM 27. Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is 
sufficient on each shift. 0.564 0.416   







Table 4. Principal Axis Factor Matrix – Varimax Rotation 
Rotated Factor Matrix(a)    
  Factor Factor Factor
 1 2 3
CC 34. In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance 
operations and all are responsible/accountable for safety. 0.694 0.421   
RM 23. Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage 
hazards associated with maintenance and the flight-line. 0.677 0.361   
QA 15. The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and 
set standards to maintain quality control. 0.675 0.280   
PA 4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. 0.670   0.250
PA 1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety 
procedures. 0.656   0.272
CC 32. Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are 
actively engaged in the safety program. 0.638 0.476   
RM 22. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional 
training/support is provided as needed. 0.637 0.416   
CC 33. Supervisors set the example for following maintenance 
standards and ensure compliance. 0.634 0.453   
RS/SC 7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. 0.634 0.329 0.302
QA 16. QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential 
to mission accomplishment. 0.628 0.377   
PA 2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a 
program that targets training deficiencies. 0.620   0.289
C/FR 43. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated 
with maintenance activities. 0.614 0.467   
PA 5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely 
monitored. 0.609   0.287
CC 35. Safety education and training are comprehensive and 
effective. 0.601 0.486   
PA 6. Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously. 0.587 0.298 0.305
PA 3. The command uses safety and medical staff to 
identify/manage personnel at risk. 0.558 0.339 0.296
C/FR 39. I get all the information I need to do my job safely. 0.554 0.534   
QA 18. Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that 
at home station. 0.539 0.400   
QA 17. QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete 
and are not pressured by supervisors to sign off. 0.534 0.420   
C/FR 40. Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with 
other work centers and maintenance. 0.527 0.511   
QA 20. QARs are helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my unit. 0.524 0.365   
RS/SC 14. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the 
command. 0.515 0.388   
RS/SC 12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors 
about personal problems/illness. 0.465 0.415   
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QA 19. Required publications/tools/equipment are available, 
current/serviceable and used. 0.442 0.442   
C/FR 38. Effective communication exists up/down the chain of 
command. 0.346 0.681   
RM 27. Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is 
sufficient on each shift.   0.674   
RM 29. Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not 
over-committed.   0.670   
RM 24. I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to 
accomplish my job. 0.298 0.663   
RM 28. Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and 
are aware of individual workload. 0.389 0.587   
RM 25. Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the 
command's ability to operate safely. 0.289 0.583   
CC 37. Maintenance Control is effective in managing all 
maintenance activities. 0.439 0.575   
CC 36. All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, 
supervised and staffed by qualified  personnel. 0.548 0.562   
RM 26. Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance 
than the flight schedule, and do not permit cutting corners. 0.470 0.558   
CC 31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work 
center supervisor decisions are respected. 0.531 0.534   
C/FR 41. My command has effective pass-down between shifts. 0.455 0.514   
RS/SC 11. The command recognizes individual safety achievement 
through rewards and incentives. 0.300 0.502   
CC 30. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are 
having problems. 0.311 0.465   
RS/SC 13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. 0.435 0.459 0.259
C/FR 42. Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes 
before flight. 0.410 0.427   
RS/SC 9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other 
violations and individuals feel free to report them. 0.281 0.291 0.671
RS/SC 8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure 
violations and encourage reporting safety concerns 0.365   0.631
RS/SC 10. Violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not 
common in this command. 0.424 0.362 0.430
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 






V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY 
Aviation maintenance, the safety of the individuals conducting the maintenance 
and the safe return from flight of every aircraft and crew member is undoubtedly a top 
priority of all Naval Aviation squadrons.  It is the responsibility these squadrons and 
every service member to ensure the environment in which they work is safe, free of 
hazards and generates mishap-free missions.  As long as human beings are involved in 
these evolutions, the mishap rate may never be zero.  Though the Navy has, throughout 
history, focused on the aircraft and crew involved in the mission as mishap factors, it has 
begun giving more attention to the maintenance aspect.  The climate, specifically safety 
climate, in which the maintenance is performed, would have an impact on how 
maintenance is accomplished.  A goal of the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey 
(MCAS) is to gauge command maintenance safety climate and affect a positive response 
to the climate. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary focus of this report was to analyze the Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey (MCAS) and mishap data to see if a relationship exists between them 
and the likelihood of a mishap.  Through data analysis, specifically, factor analysis, the 
MCAS was found to be an inadequate tool with questionable validity for gauging 
maintenance safety climate.  It has one main factor on which every MCAS question 
loads.  With one main factor, the MCAS is not providing the results in content areas as 
originally planned.  The MCAS questions were based on items asked on the Climate 
Assessment Survey and do not appear to have much concrete psychometric influence.  
Consequently, the value of this survey as a tool to measure safety climate is fairly low.  
The analysis of the data clearly shows that with only one factor, versus six which would 
correspond to the six MOSE categories, the MCAS is not measuring what it was intended 
to measure.  There are two secondary factors, but these have minimal influence.  Since 
every survey item loads on the main factor significantly, it can be said that essentially the 
items are all asking the same general question.  Due to these findings, the relationship 
between the MCAS, mishaps and whether the MCAS can determine the likelihood of 
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mishaps was not analyzed by this research.  Previous research has examined the 
predictive power of the MCAS.  The present study sought to elucidate which aspects of 
the MCAS predict safety but results indicate that psychometrically there are no distinct 
aspects or factors to be found in the MCAS.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The MCAS should be evaluated by a survey developer to include psychometrics 
and valid question formulations.  If the survey is intended to provide a measure of the 
maintenance safety climate at such a large scale, the instrument must present the best 








































• Total years aviation maintenance experience (<1, 1-2, 3-5, 6-10, 11-15, 
16-20, 20+) 
• Work center (Airframes, Avionics, Flight Line, Maintenance Control, 
Ordnance, Power Plants, QA, Survival, Other) 
• Primary Shift (Day, Night) 
• Current model aircraft 
• Status (Regular, Active Reserve, Drilling Reserve) 
• Service (USN, USMC, other) 
• Parent command 
• Unit location 
 
Likert Scale Items 
• Likert Scale response values:  1 - Strongly Disagree, 2 - Disagree, 3 - 
Neutral, 4 - Agree, and 5 - Strongly Agree 
• Respondents may also answer Don’t Know or Not Applicable 
 
Process Auditing 
1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures. 
2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that 
targets training deficiencies. 
3. The command uses safety and medical staff to identify/manage personnel 
at risk. 
4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. 
5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored. 
6. Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously. 
 
Reward System and Safety Culture 
7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. 
8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure violations and 
encourage reporting safety concerns. 
9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and 
individuals feel free to report them. 
10. Violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not common in this 
command. 
11. The command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards 
and incentives. 
12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal 
problems/illness. 
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13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. 
14. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the command. 
 
Quality Assurance 
15. The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards 
to maintain quality control. 
16.    QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission 
accomplishment. 
17.    QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not 
pressured by supervisors to sign-off. 
18.    Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that at home station. 
19.   Required publications/tools/equipment are available, current/serviceable 
and used. 
20.    QARs are helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my unit. 
 
Risk Management 
21.    Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect 
maintenance. 
22.    Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is 
provided as needed. 
23. Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards associated 
with maintenance and the flight-line. 
24. I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to accomplish my job. 
25. Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the command's ability to 
operate safely. 
26. Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight 
schedule, and do not permit cutting corners. 
27. Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is sufficient on each 
shift. 
28. Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aware of 
individual workload. 
29. Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not over-
committed. 
 
Command and Control 
30. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems. 
31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor 
decisions are respected. 
32. Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are actively engaged 
in the safety program. 
33. Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and 
ensure compliance.  
34. In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance operations and all 
are responsible/accountable for safety. 
35. Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective. 
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36. All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervised and staffed by 
qualified personnel. 
37. Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities. 
 
Communication / Functional Relationships 
38.    Effective communication exists up/down the chain of command. 
39.    I get all the information I need to do my job safely. 
40.    Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with other work centers 
and maintenance. 
41.    My command has effective pass-down between shifts. 
42.    Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes before flight. 





























  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid   24 .0 .0 .0 
  SQDN 100 132 .1 .1 .1 
  SQDN 101 445 .4 .4 .5 
  SQDN 102 320 .3 .3 .7 
  SQDN 103 380 .3 .3 1.0 
  SQDN 106 713 .6 .6 1.6 
  SQDN 107 569 .5 .5 2.0 
  SQDN 108 413 .3 .3 2.4 
  SQDN 109 504 .4 .4 2.8 
  SQDN 11 46 .0 .0 2.8 
  SQDN 110 732 .6 .6 3.4 
  SQDN 112 411 .3 .3 3.7 
  SQDN 113 316 .3 .3 4.0 
  SQDN 114 302 .2 .2 4.2 
  SQDN 115 266 .2 .2 4.4 
  SQDN 116 246 .2 .2 4.6 
  SQDN 117 214 .2 .2 4.8 
  SQDN 118 875 .7 .7 5.5 
  SQDN 119 33 .0 .0 5.5 
  SQDN 12 161 .1 .1 5.6 
  SQDN 120 718 .6 .6 6.2 
  SQDN 121 198 .2 .2 6.4 
  SQDN 122 390 .3 .3 6.7 
  SQDN 123 363 .3 .3 7.0 
  SQDN 124 58 .0 .0 7.0 
  SQDN 125 743 .6 .6 7.6 
  SQDN 127 59 .0 .0 7.6 
  SQDN 128 318 .3 .3 7.9 
  SQDN 13 1004 .8 .8 8.7 
  SQDN 130 715 .6 .6 9.3 
  SQDN 131 430 .3 .3 9.6 
  SQDN 132 513 .4 .4 10.0 
  SQDN 135 356 .3 .3 10.3 
  SQDN 137 19 .0 .0 10.3 
  SQDN 138 316 .3 .3 10.6 
  SQDN 139 809 .6 .6 11.2 
  SQDN 14 546 .4 .4 11.6 
  SQDN 140 474 .4 .4 12.0 
  SQDN 141 576 .5 .5 12.5 
  SQDN 143 421 .3 .3 12.8 
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  SQDN 144 500 .4 .4 13.2 
  SQDN 146 263 .2 .2 13.4 
  SQDN 147 459 .4 .4 13.8 
  SQDN 148 10 .0 .0 13.8 
  SQDN 149 215 .2 .2 13.9 
  SQDN 15 96 .1 .1 14.0 
  SQDN 150 571 .5 .5 14.5 
  SQDN 151 279 .2 .2 14.7 
  SQDN 152 1822 1.4 1.4 16.1 
  SQDN 154 46 .0 .0 16.2 
  SQDN 157 397 .3 .3 16.5 
  SQDN 158 123 .1 .1 16.6 
  SQDN 159 590 .5 .5 17.1 
  SQDN 16 362 .3 .3 17.3 
  SQDN 161 353 .3 .3 17.6 
  SQDN 162 212 .2 .2 17.8 
  SQDN 164 89 .1 .1 17.9 
  SQDN 165 345 .3 .3 18.1 
  SQDN 166 101 .1 .1 18.2 
  SQDN 167 39 .0 .0 18.2 
  SQDN 168 269 .2 .2 18.5 
  SQDN 169 538 .4 .4 18.9 
  SQDN 17 380 .3 .3 19.2 
  SQDN 170 356 .3 .3 19.5 
  SQDN 171 76 .1 .1 19.5 
  SQDN 172 329 .3 .3 19.8 
  SQDN 173 303 .2 .2 20.0 
  SQDN 174 636 .5 .5 20.5 
  SQDN 176 56 .0 .0 20.6 
  SQDN 177 286 .2 .2 20.8 
  SQDN 18 561 .4 .4 21.3 
  SQDN 180 476 .4 .4 21.6 
  SQDN 183 126 .1 .1 21.7 
  SQDN 185 290 .2 .2 22.0 
  SQDN 186 176 .1 .1 22.1 
  SQDN 188 290 .2 .2 22.3 
  SQDN 189 275 .2 .2 22.5 
  SQDN 19 217 .2 .2 22.7 
  SQDN 190 731 .6 .6 23.3 
  SQDN 191 235 .2 .2 23.5 
  SQDN 193 650 .5 .5 24.0 
  SQDN 194 589 .5 .5 24.5 
  SQDN 195 1275 1.0 1.0 25.5 
  SQDN 196 156 .1 .1 25.6 
  SQDN 197 58 .0 .0 25.7 
  SQDN 198 897 .7 .7 26.4 
  SQDN 199 387 .3 .3 26.7 
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  SQDN 20 496 .4 .4 27.1 
  SQDN 200 396 .3 .3 27.4 
  SQDN 201 549 .4 .4 27.8 
  SQDN 202 648 .5 .5 28.3 
  SQDN 203 537 .4 .4 28.8 
  SQDN 206 202 .2 .2 28.9 
  SQDN 207 484 .4 .4 29.3 
  SQDN 208 289 .2 .2 29.5 
  SQDN 209 534 .4 .4 29.9 
  SQDN 21 181 .1 .1 30.1 
  SQDN 211 65 .1 .1 30.1 
  SQDN 212 275 .2 .2 30.4 
  SQDN 213 309 .2 .2 30.6 
  SQDN 214 1117 .9 .9 31.5 
  SQDN 216 542 .4 .4 31.9 
  SQDN 217 725 .6 .6 32.5 
  SQDN 218 355 .3 .3 32.8 
  SQDN 219 442 .4 .4 33.1 
  SQDN 22 930 .7 .7 33.9 
  SQDN 220 254 .2 .2 34.1 
  SQDN 221 657 .5 .5 34.6 
  SQDN 222 182 .1 .1 34.7 
  SQDN 223 258 .2 .2 34.9 
  SQDN 225 403 .3 .3 35.3 
  SQDN 226 559 .4 .4 35.7 
  SQDN 228 339 .3 .3 36.0 
  SQDN 229 1222 1.0 1.0 36.9 
  SQDN 23 78 .1 .1 37.0 
  SQDN 230 677 .5 .5 37.5 
  SQDN 231 381 .3 .3 37.8 
  SQDN 232 327 .3 .3 38.1 
  SQDN 234 312 .2 .2 38.3 
  SQDN 235 691 .5 .5 38.9 
  SQDN 236 58 .0 .0 38.9 
  SQDN 237 143 .1 .1 39.1 
  SQDN 238 934 .7 .7 39.8 
  SQDN 24 297 .2 .2 40.0 
  SQDN 240 20 .0 .0 40.0 
  SQDN 241 20 .0 .0 40.1 
  SQDN 242 30 .0 .0 40.1 
  SQDN 243 234 .2 .2 40.3 
  SQDN 244 417 .3 .3 40.6 
  SQDN 245 793 .6 .6 41.2 
  SQDN 246 643 .5 .5 41.7 
  SQDN 247 35 .0 .0 41.8 
  SQDN 248 227 .2 .2 42.0 
  SQDN 249 554 .4 .4 42.4 
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  SQDN 25 1309 1.0 1.0 43.4 
  SQDN 250 510 .4 .4 43.8 
  SQDN 251 543 .4 .4 44.3 
  SQDN 252 283 .2 .2 44.5 
  SQDN 257 695 .6 .6 45.0 
  SQDN 258 422 .3 .3 45.4 
  SQDN 259 130 .1 .1 45.5 
  SQDN 260 560 .4 .4 45.9 
  SQDN 261 83 .1 .1 46.0 
  SQDN 262 415 .3 .3 46.3 
  SQDN 263 276 .2 .2 46.5 
  SQDN 264 185 .1 .1 46.7 
  SQDN 27 308 .2 .2 46.9 
  SQDN 270 644 .5 .5 47.4 
  SQDN 271 369 .3 .3 47.7 
  SQDN 272 462 .4 .4 48.1 
  SQDN 273 943 .7 .7 48.8 
  SQDN 275 361 .3 .3 49.1 
  SQDN 276 369 .3 .3 49.4 
  SQDN 277 706 .6 .6 50.0 
  SQDN 278 481 .4 .4 50.4 
  SQDN 279 57 .0 .0 50.4 
  SQDN 28 271 .2 .2 50.6 
  SQDN 280 580 .5 .5 51.1 
  SQDN 281 297 .2 .2 51.3 
  SQDN 282 587 .5 .5 51.8 
  SQDN 283 43 .0 .0 51.8 
  SQDN 284 221 .2 .2 52.0 
  SQDN 285 377 .3 .3 52.3 
  SQDN 286 393 .3 .3 52.6 
  SQDN 288 359 .3 .3 52.9 
  SQDN 289 101 .1 .1 53.0 
  SQDN 291 160 .1 .1 53.1 
  SQDN 292 73 .1 .1 53.2 
  SQDN 293 441 .3 .3 53.5 
  SQDN 294 513 .4 .4 53.9 
  SQDN 295 519 .4 .4 54.3 
  SQDN 296 599 .5 .5 54.8 
  SQDN 297 319 .3 .3 55.1 
  SQDN 298 405 .3 .3 55.4 
  SQDN 299 523 .4 .4 55.8 
  SQDN 300 211 .2 .2 56.0 
  SQDN 301 1698 1.3 1.3 57.3 
  SQDN 305 300 .2 .2 57.5 
  SQDN 306 334 .3 .3 57.8 
  SQDN 307 327 .3 .3 58.1 
  SQDN 309 523 .4 .4 58.5 
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  SQDN 310 401 .3 .3 58.8 
  SQDN 312 573 .5 .5 59.3 
  SQDN 315 221 .2 .2 59.4 
  SQDN 316 303 .2 .2 59.7 
  SQDN 318 149 .1 .1 59.8 
  SQDN 32 152 .1 .1 59.9 
  SQDN 320 669 .5 .5 60.4 
  SQDN 321 447 .4 .4 60.8 
  SQDN 322 487 .4 .4 61.2 
  SQDN 323 335 .3 .3 61.4 
  SQDN 324 604 .5 .5 61.9 
  SQDN 325 95 .1 .1 62.0 
  SQDN 326 290 .2 .2 62.2 
  SQDN 327 35 .0 .0 62.3 
  SQDN 328 751 .6 .6 62.9 
  SQDN 329 1 .0 .0 62.9 
  SQDN 330 608 .5 .5 63.3 
  SQDN 331 465 .4 .4 63.7 
  SQDN 332 702 .6 .6 64.3 
  SQDN 335 27 .0 .0 64.3 
  SQDN 336 732 .6 .6 64.9 
  SQDN 338 390 .3 .3 65.2 
  SQDN 34 561 .4 .4 65.6 
  SQDN 341 304 .2 .2 65.9 
  SQDN 342 97 .1 .1 65.9 
  SQDN 344 831 .7 .7 66.6 
  SQDN 345 716 .6 .6 67.2 
  SQDN 35 387 .3 .3 67.5 
  SQDN 350 255 .2 .2 67.7 
  SQDN 351 494 .4 .4 68.1 
  SQDN 352 199 .2 .2 68.2 
  SQDN 353 494 .4 .4 68.6 
  SQDN 354 234 .2 .2 68.8 
  SQDN 356 345 .3 .3 69.1 
  SQDN 357 1366 1.1 1.1 70.2 
  SQDN 359 529 .4 .4 70.6 
  SQDN 36 219 .2 .2 70.8 
  SQDN 361 1666 1.3 1.3 72.1 
  SQDN 362 74 .1 .1 72.1 
  SQDN 364 320 .3 .3 72.4 
  SQDN 365 409 .3 .3 72.7 
  SQDN 366 355 .3 .3 73.0 
  SQDN 368 93 .1 .1 73.1 
  SQDN 369 609 .5 .5 73.6 
  SQDN 37 366 .3 .3 73.8 
  SQDN 371 95 .1 .1 73.9 
  SQDN 372 20 .0 .0 73.9 
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  SQDN 373 115 .1 .1 74.0 
  SQDN 375 534 .4 .4 74.4 
  SQDN 376 430 .3 .3 74.8 
  SQDN 378 613 .5 .5 75.3 
  SQDN 379 195 .2 .2 75.4 
  SQDN 38 362 .3 .3 75.7 
  SQDN 381 520 .4 .4 76.1 
  SQDN 382 612 .5 .5 76.6 
  SQDN 383 812 .6 .6 77.3 
  SQDN 386 642 .5 .5 77.8 
  SQDN 387 349 .3 .3 78.0 
  SQDN 388 536 .4 .4 78.5 
  SQDN 390 1208 1.0 1.0 79.4 
  SQDN 391 919 .7 .7 80.2 
  SQDN 392 861 .7 .7 80.8 
  SQDN 393 867 .7 .7 81.5 
  SQDN 395 207 .2 .2 81.7 
  SQDN 396 664 .5 .5 82.2 
  SQDN 398 61 .0 .0 82.3 
  SQDN 40 441 .3 .3 82.6 
  SQDN 400 328 .3 .3 82.9 
  SQDN 401 158 .1 .1 83.0 
  SQDN 403 121 .1 .1 83.1 
  SQDN 404 399 .3 .3 83.4 
  SQDN 406 144 .1 .1 83.5 
  SQDN 410 180 .1 .1 83.7 
  SQDN 411 220 .2 .2 83.8 
  SQDN 413 391 .3 .3 84.2 
  SQDN 414 463 .4 .4 84.5 
  SQDN 416 119 .1 .1 84.6 
  SQDN 417 632 .5 .5 85.1 
  SQDN 418 623 .5 .5 85.6 
  SQDN 419 379 .3 .3 85.9 
  SQDN 44 23 .0 .0 85.9 
  SQDN 46 249 .2 .2 86.1 
  SQDN 47 267 .2 .2 86.3 
  SQDN 49 31 .0 .0 86.4 
  SQDN 5 247 .2 .2 86.6 
  SQDN 50 1 .0 .0 86.6 
  SQDN 51 100 .1 .1 86.6 
  SQDN 52 145 .1 .1 86.8 
  SQDN 54 624 .5 .5 87.3 
  SQDN 55 374 .3 .3 87.6 
  SQDN 56 268 .2 .2 87.8 
  SQDN 57 86 .1 .1 87.8 
  SQDN 6 369 .3 .3 88.1 
  SQDN 60 296 .2 .2 88.4 
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  SQDN 61 367 .3 .3 88.7 
  SQDN 62 241 .2 .2 88.8 
  SQDN 64 711 .6 .6 89.4 
  SQDN 65 613 .5 .5 89.9 
  SQDN 66 649 .5 .5 90.4 
  SQDN 67 210 .2 .2 90.6 
  SQDN 68 854 .7 .7 91.3 
  SQDN 69 346 .3 .3 91.5 
  SQDN 7 760 .6 .6 92.1 
  SQDN 70 123 .1 .1 92.2 
  SQDN 71 465 .4 .4 92.6 
  SQDN 72 429 .3 .3 92.9 
  SQDN 73 499 .4 .4 93.3 
  SQDN 74 410 .3 .3 93.7 
  SQDN 75 426 .3 .3 94.0 
  SQDN 76 480 .4 .4 94.4 
  SQDN 77 743 .6 .6 95.0 
  SQDN 80 226 .2 .2 95.1 
  SQDN 81 336 .3 .3 95.4 
  SQDN 82 879 .7 .7 96.1 
  SQDN 83 175 .1 .1 96.2 
  SQDN 85 665 .5 .5 96.8 
  SQDN 87 528 .4 .4 97.2 
  SQDN 88 415 .3 .3 97.5 
  SQDN 89 496 .4 .4 97.9 
  SQDN 90 130 .1 .1 98.0 
  SQDN 93 625 .5 .5 98.5 
  SQDN 94 272 .2 .2 98.7 
  SQDN 96 201 .2 .2 98.9 
  SQDN 97 655 .5 .5 99.4 
  SQDN 98 362 .3 .3 99.7 
  SQDN 99 383 .3 .3 100.0 





















  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
AIMD 1786 1.4 1.4 1.4 
HC 3695 2.9 2.9 4.3 
HCS 316 .3 .3 4.6 
HM 1323 1.0 1.0 5.6 
HMH 4473 3.5 3.5 9.2 
HMLA 5923 4.7 4.7 13.9 
HMM 5461 4.3 4.3 18.2 
HMX 269 .2 .2 18.4 
HS 4579 3.6 3.6 22.1 
HSC 661 .5 .5 22.6 
HSL 6873 5.5 5.5 28.0 
MALS 9233 7.3 7.3 35.4 
MCAS 2254 1.8 1.8 37.2 
NAS/N
AF 490 .4 .4 37.6 
RDTE 904 .7 .7 38.3 
VAQ 7473 5.9 5.9 44.2 
VAW 5128 4.1 4.1 48.3 
VC 512 .4 .4 48.7 
VF 3676 2.9 2.9 51.6 
VFA 18225 14.5 14.5 66.0 
VFC 412 .3 .3 66.4 
VMA 4146 3.3 3.3 69.7 
VMAQ 1360 1.1 1.1 70.7 
VMFA 8229 6.5 6.5 77.3 
VMGR 2174 1.7 1.7 79.0 
VMM 327 .3 .3 79.3 
VMR 100 .1 .1 79.3 
VMU 215 .2 .2 79.5 
VP 12835 10.2 10.2 89.7 
VQ 2815 2.2 2.2 91.9 
VR 2692 2.1 2.1 94.1 
VRC 1086 .9 .9 94.9 
VS 5084 4.0 4.0 98.9 
VT 57 .0 .0 99.0 
VX 1272 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Valid 








































































































  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  450 .4 .4 .4 
E-1 TO E-3 19495 15.5 15.5 15.8 
E-4 TO E-5 30785 24.4 24.4 40.2 
E-6 TO E-7 11838 9.4 9.4 49.6 
E-7 TO E-8 3 .0 .0 49.6 
E-8 TO E-9 1285 1.0 1.0 50.7 
E1-E3 16826 13.3 13.3 64.0 
E4-E5 28113 22.3 22.3 86.3 
E6-E7 12867 10.2 10.2 96.5 
E8-E9 1371 1.1 1.1 97.6 
O-1 TO O-3 811 .6 .6 98.2 
O-4 TO O-6 201 .2 .2 98.4 
O1-O3 896 .7 .7 99.1 
O4-O6 271 .2 .2 99.3 
WO-1 TO 
CWO-5 407 .3 .3 99.7 
WO1-
CWO5 439 .3 .3 100.0 
Valid 




*Note on Rank Charts:  The data were split into two separate worksheets and the ranks were named two 
different ways (i.e., E-1 TO E-3 and E-1-E-3).  When added together, the total of those two divisions will 








  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  451 .4 .4 .4 
other 17 .0 .0 .4 
Other 266 .2 .2 .6 
USMC 42948 34.1 34.1 34.7 
USN 82376 65.3 65.3 100.0 
Valid 






































  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Afloat 365 .3 .3 .3 
AFLOAT 9950 7.9 7.9 8.2 
Ashore 74 .1 .1 8.2 
ASHORE 96249 76.4 76.4 84.6 
FRS 3642 2.9 2.9 87.5 
OVERSE
AS 15778 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 126058 100.0 100.0   















Note on Location Chart:  The data were split into two separate worksheets and the locations were named 
two different ways (i.e., AFLOAT and Afloat).  When added together, the total of those two divisions will 
denote the sum of all members who took the survey in that rank category. 
 
--------------- 
For reference on frequencies for Questions 1-43 the “missing” Likert variables, 0 and 6, 
refer to Not Applicable and Don’t Know responses.  Neither of these responses was used 






PA 1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures. 
 




disagree 1241 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Disagree 2780 2.2 2.3 3.3 
Neutral 16496 13.1 13.6 17.0 
Agree 75957 60.3 62.8 79.7 
Strongly 
agree 24562 19.5 20.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121036 96.0 100.0   
0 351 .3     
6 4671 3.7     
Missing 
Total 5022 4.0     





PA 2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that targets training 
deficiencies. 
 




disagree 1687 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Disagree 6229 4.9 5.2 6.6 
Neutral 17778 14.1 14.7 21.3 
Agree 72115 57.2 59.7 81.0 
Strongly 
agree 23005 18.2 19.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 120814 95.8 100.0   
0 482 .4     
6 4762 3.8     
Missing 
Total 5244 4.2     







PA 3. The command uses safety and medical staff to identify/manage personnel at risk. 
 




disagree 1956 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Disagree 7787 6.2 6.5 8.2 
Neutral 23895 19.0 20.0 28.2 
Agree 68846 54.6 57.7 85.9 
Strongly 
agree 16885 13.4 14.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 119369 94.7 100.0   
0 408 .3     
6 6281 5.0     
Missing 
Total 6689 5.3     





PA 4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. 
 




disagree 1366 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Disagree 3620 2.9 3.0 4.1 
Neutral 13191 10.5 10.9 15.0 
Agree 64834 51.4 53.4 68.4 
Strongly 
agree 38404 30.5 31.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121415 96.3 100.0   
0 750 .6     
6 3893 3.1     
Missing 
Total 4643 3.7     








PA 5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored. 
 




disagree 1837 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Disagree 6510 5.2 5.3 6.8 
Neutral 17401 13.8 14.2 21.1 
Agree 64217 50.9 52.5 73.6 
Strongly 
agree 32311 25.6 26.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122276 97.0 100.0   
0 571 .5     
6 3211 2.5     
Missing 
Total 3782 3.0     




PA 6. Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously. 
 




disagree 3001 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Disagree 8595 6.8 7.0 9.4 
Neutral 20243 16.1 16.5 25.9 
Agree 61949 49.1 50.3 76.2 
Strongly 
agree 29249 23.2 23.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123037 97.6 100.0   
0 408 .3     
6 2613 2.1     
Missing 
Total 3021 2.4     








RS/SC 7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. 
 




disagree 2134 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Disagree 5275 4.2 4.3 6.0 
Neutral 18314 14.5 14.8 20.7 
Agree 67438 53.5 54.3 75.1 
Strongly 
agree 30932 24.5 24.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 124093 98.4 100.0   
0 329 .3     
6 1636 1.3     
Missing 
Total 1965 1.6     





RS/SC 8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure violations and encourage 
reporting safety concerns 
 




disagree 3424 2.7 2.9 2.9 
Disagree 7748 6.1 6.5 9.3 
Neutral 21155 16.8 17.7 27.0 
Agree 64569 51.2 53.9 81.0 
Strongly 
agree 22797 18.1 19.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 119693 95.0 100.0   
0 687 .5     
6 5678 4.5     
Missing 
Total 6365 5.0     

















RS/SC 9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and individuals feel free to 
report them. 
 




disagree 3405 2.7 2.9 2.9 
Disagree 11478 9.1 9.7 12.6 
Neutral 30624 24.3 25.9 38.6 
Agree 58815 46.7 49.8 88.4 
Strongly 
agree 13709 10.9 11.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 118031 93.6 100.0   
0 790 .6     
6 7237 5.7     
Missing 
Total 8027 6.4     





RS/SC 10. Violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not common in this command. 
 




disagree 2281 1.8 2.0 2.0 
Disagree 9760 7.7 8.5 10.4 
Neutral 29658 23.5 25.7 36.1 
Agree 60194 47.8 52.2 88.3 
Strongly 
agree 13489 10.7 11.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 115382 91.5 100.0   
0 704 .6     
6 9972 7.9     
Missing 
Total 10676 8.5     

















RS/SC 11. The command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards and incentives. 
 




disagree 9470 7.5 7.9 7.9 
Disagree 19951 15.8 16.6 24.5 
Neutral 31204 24.8 26.0 50.4 
Agree 46928 37.2 39.0 89.5 
Strongly 
agree 12637 10.0 10.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 120190 95.3 100.0   
0 432 .3     
6 5436 4.3     
Missing 
Total 5868 4.7     





RS/SC 12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems/illness. 
 




disagree 4866 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Disagree 9753 7.7 7.9 11.9 
Neutral 21720 17.2 17.6 29.5 
Agree 64319 51.0 52.1 81.6 
Strongly 
agree 22677 18.0 18.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123335 97.8 100.0   
0 312 .2     
6 2411 1.9     
Missing 
Total 2723 2.2     















RS/SC 13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. 
 




disagree 4012 3.2 3.5 3.5 
Disagree 12140 9.6 10.5 14.0 
Neutral 30236 24.0 26.2 40.1 
Agree 54338 43.1 47.0 87.1 
Strongly 
agree 14894 11.8 12.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 115620 91.7 100.0   
0 759 .6     
6 9679 7.7     
Missing 
Total 10438 8.3     





RS/SC 14. Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the command. 
 




disagree 4095 3.2 3.3 3.3 
Disagree 9509 7.5 7.6 10.9 
Neutral 23308 18.5 18.7 29.7 
Agree 61270 48.6 49.3 78.9 
Strongly 
agree 26223 20.8 21.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 124405 98.7 100.0   
0 282 .2     
6 1371 1.1     
Missing 
Total 1653 1.3     

















QA 15. The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards to maintain 
quality control. 
 




disagree 1531 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 3649 2.9 3.0 4.2 
Neutral 18031 14.3 14.7 18.9 
Agree 63786 50.6 52.0 70.9 
Strongly 
agree 35623 28.3 29.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122620 97.3 100.0   
0 405 .3     
6 3033 2.4     
Missing 
Total 3438 2.7     




QA 16. QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission accomplishment. 
 




disagree 2328 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 6585 5.2 5.3 7.2 
Neutral 22546 17.9 18.3 25.5 
Agree 66865 53.0 54.2 79.7 
Strongly 
agree 25053 19.9 20.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123377 97.9 100.0   
0 412 .3     
6 2269 1.8     
Missing 
Total 2681 2.1     








QA 17. QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not pressured by supervisors 
to sign off. 
 




disagree 3211 2.5 2.7 2.7 
Disagree 8433 6.7 7.1 9.8 
Neutral 21549 17.1 18.1 28.0 
Agree 63641 50.5 53.6 81.5 
Strongly 
agree 21918 17.4 18.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 118752 94.2 100.0   
0 953 .8     
6 6353 5.0     
Missing 
Total 7306 5.8     





QA 18. Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that at home station. 
 




disagree 3133 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Disagree 7791 6.2 7.1 10.0 
Neutral 20381 16.2 18.6 28.5 
Agree 57802 45.9 52.7 81.2 
Strongly 
agree 20598 16.3 18.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 109705 87.0 100.0   
0 3553 2.8     
6 12800 10.2     
Missing 
Total 16353 13.0     








QA 19. Required publications/tools/equipment are available, current/serviceable and used. 
 




disagree 4359 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Disagree 10107 8.0 8.2 11.8 
Neutral 19154 15.2 15.6 27.4 
Agree 66587 52.8 54.2 81.6 
Strongly 
agree 22655 18.0 18.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122862 97.5 100.0   
0 532 .4     
6 2664 2.1     
Missing 
Total 3196 2.5     





QA 20. QARs are helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my unit. 
 




disagree 2995 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Disagree 7292 5.8 6.0 8.5 
Neutral 22000 17.5 18.1 26.6 
Agree 66471 52.7 54.7 81.3 
Strongly 
agree 22755 18.1 18.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121513 96.4 100.0   
0 697 .6     
6 3848 3.1     
Missing 
Total 4545 3.6     








RM 22. Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is provided as 
needed. 
 




disagree 1360 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Disagree 4625 3.7 3.8 4.9 
Neutral 21880 17.4 17.8 22.7 
Agree 77201 61.2 62.8 85.5 
Strongly 
agree 17884 14.2 14.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122950 97.5 100.0   
0 440 .3     
6 2668 2.1     
Missing 
Total 3108 2.5     





RM 23. Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards associated with maintenance 
and the flight-line. 
 




disagree 1239 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Disagree 3388 2.7 2.8 3.8 
Neutral 17927 14.2 14.6 18.4 
Agree 78689 62.4 64.3 82.7 
Strongly 
agree 21141 16.8 17.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122384 97.1 100.0   
0 869 .7     
6 2805 2.2     
Missing 
Total 3674 2.9     















RM 24. I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to accomplish my job. 
 




disagree 7441 5.9 6.0 6.0 
Disagree 15505 12.3 12.5 18.5 
Neutral 26440 21.0 21.3 39.8 
Agree 60135 47.7 48.5 88.2 
Strongly 
agree 14590 11.6 11.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 124111 98.5 100.0   
0 585 .5     
6 1362 1.1     
Missing 
Total 1947 1.5     




RM 25. Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the command's ability to operate safely. 
 




disagree 5276 4.2 4.4 4.4 
Disagree 13311 10.6 11.0 15.4 
Neutral 27857 22.1 23.1 38.5 
Agree 61970 49.2 51.4 89.9 
Strongly 
agree 12234 9.7 10.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 120648 95.7 100.0   
0 642 .5     
6 4768 3.8     
Missing 
Total 5410 4.3     















RM 26. Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight schedule, and do not 
permit cutting corners. 
 




disagree 5247 4.2 4.3 4.3 
Disagree 11597 9.2 9.6 13.9 
Neutral 26720 21.2 22.1 36.0 
Agree 58101 46.1 48.0 83.9 
Strongly 
agree 19497 15.5 16.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121162 96.1 100.0   
0 1358 1.1     
6 3538 2.8     
Missing 
Total 4896 3.9     




RM 27. Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is sufficient on each shift. 
 




disagree 15850 12.6 13.6 13.6 
Disagree 24071 19.1 20.6 34.2 
Neutral 27864 22.1 23.8 58.0 
Agree 40595 32.2 34.7 92.7 
Strongly 
agree 8503 6.7 7.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 116883 92.7 100.0   
0 4604 3.7     
6 4571 3.6     
Missing 
Total 9175 7.3     















RM 28. Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aware of individual workload. 
 




disagree 4305 3.4 3.5 3.5 
Disagree 12509 9.9 10.3 13.9 
Neutral 30918 24.5 25.5 39.3 
Agree 62272 49.4 51.3 90.6 
Strongly 
agree 11357 9.0 9.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121361 96.3 100.0   
0 512 .4     
6 4185 3.3     
Missing 
Total 4697 3.7     





RM 29. Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not over-committed. 
 




disagree 8244 6.5 7.1 7.1 
Disagree 16318 12.9 14.1 21.2 
Neutral 35809 28.4 30.9 52.1 
Agree 47441 37.6 40.9 93.0 
Strongly 
agree 8108 6.4 7.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 115920 92.0 100.0   
0 718 .6     
6 9420 7.5     
Missing 
Total 10138 8.0     







CC 30. My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems. 
 




disagree 3340 2.6 3.1 3.1 
Disagree 12225 9.7 11.4 14.5 
Neutral 33043 26.2 30.7 45.2 
Agree 49763 39.5 46.3 91.5 
Strongly 
agree 9176 7.3 8.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 107547 85.3 100.0   
0 1091 .9     
6 17420 13.8     
Missing 
Total 18511 14.7     





CC 31. Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor decisions are 
respected. 
 




disagree 3028 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Disagree 7672 6.1 6.3 8.7 
Neutral 23279 18.5 19.0 27.8 
Agree 72539 57.5 59.2 87.0 
Strongly 
agree 15918 12.6 13.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122436 97.1 100.0   
0 426 .3     
6 3196 2.5     
Missing 
Total 3622 2.9     







CC 32. Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are actively engaged in the safety 
program. 
 




disagree 1431 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 4880 3.9 4.0 5.2 
Neutral 25253 20.0 20.7 25.9 
Agree 74976 59.5 61.4 87.3 
Strongly 
agree 15537 12.3 12.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 122077 96.8 100.0   
0 410 .3     
6 3571 2.8     
Missing 
Total 3981 3.2     





CC 33. Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and ensure compliance. 
 




disagree 2013 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Disagree 5453 4.3 4.4 6.1 
Neutral 22967 18.2 18.7 24.7 
Agree 74720 59.3 60.7 85.4 
Strongly 
agree 17914 14.2 14.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123067 97.6 100.0   
0 482 .4     
6 2509 2.0     
Missing 
Total 2991 2.4     







CC 34. In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance operations and all are 
responsible/accountable for safety. 
 




disagree 1454 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 3893 3.1 3.2 4.3 
Neutral 20548 16.3 16.6 21.0 
Agree 74464 59.1 60.3 81.2 
Strongly 
agree 23199 18.4 18.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123558 98.0 100.0   
0 401 .3     
6 2099 1.7     
Missing 
Total 2500 2.0     





CC 35. Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective. 
 




disagree 1816 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Disagree 6093 4.8 4.9 6.4 
Neutral 26779 21.2 21.7 28.1 
Agree 72068 57.2 58.3 86.4 
Strongly 
agree 16871 13.4 13.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123627 98.1 100.0   
0 371 .3     
6 2060 1.6     
Missing 
Total 2431 1.9     







CC 36. All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervised and staffed by qualified  
personnel. 
 




disagree 2308 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 8983 7.1 7.4 9.3 
Neutral 24630 19.5 20.2 29.5 
Agree 69715 55.3 57.3 86.8 
Strongly 
agree 16128 12.8 13.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121764 96.6 100.0   
0 641 .5     
6 3653 2.9     
Missing 
Total 4294 3.4     





CC 37. Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities. 
 




disagree 5172 4.1 4.3 4.3 
Disagree 10431 8.3 8.6 12.8 
Neutral 26122 20.7 21.5 34.3 
Agree 62365 49.5 51.3 85.6 
Strongly 
agree 17572 13.9 14.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121662 96.5 100.0   
0 903 .7     
6 3493 2.8     
Missing 
Total 4396 3.5     







 C/FR 38. Effective communication exists up/down the chain of command. 
 




disagree 9147 7.3 7.4 7.4 
Disagree 18096 14.4 14.6 22.0 
Neutral 30671 24.3 24.8 46.9 
Agree 52998 42.0 42.9 89.7 
Strongly 
agree 12687 10.1 10.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 123599 98.0 100.0   
0 333 .3     
6 2126 1.7     
Missing 
Total 2459 2.0     





C/FR 39. I get all the information I need to do my job safely. 
 




disagree 2474 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Disagree 6425 5.1 5.2 7.2 
Neutral 23211 18.4 18.7 25.9 
Agree 73262 58.1 59.0 84.9 
Strongly 
agree 18698 14.8 15.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 124070 98.4 100.0   
0 584 .5     
6 1404 1.1     
Missing 
Total 1988 1.6     







C/FR 40. Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with other work centers and 
maintenance. 
 




disagree 2414 1.9 2.0 2.0 
Disagree 7892 6.3 6.5 8.5 
Neutral 23815 18.9 19.6 28.1 
Agree 71512 56.7 59.0 87.1 
Strongly 
agree 15610 12.4 12.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 121243 96.2 100.0   
0 680 .5     
6 4135 3.3     
Missing 
Total 4815 3.8     





C/FR 41. My command has effective pass-down between shifts. 
 




disagree 3156 2.5 2.6 2.6 
Disagree 9333 7.4 7.8 10.4 
Neutral 25553 20.3 21.3 31.6 
Agree 64666 51.3 53.8 85.4 
Strongly 
agree 17515 13.9 14.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 120223 95.4 100.0   
0 2986 2.4     
6 2849 2.3     
Missing 
Total 5835 4.6     

















 C/FR 42. Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes before flight. 
 




disagree 3224 2.6 2.8 2.8 
Disagree 7104 5.6 6.2 9.0 
Neutral 26027 20.6 22.7 31.6 
Agree 61292 48.6 53.3 85.0 
Strongly 
agree 17243 13.7 15.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 114890 91.1 100.0   
0 3910 3.1     
6 7258 5.8     
Missing 
Total 11168 8.9     





C/FR 43. Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance activities. 
 




disagree 1853 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Disagree 5203 4.1 4.3 5.8 
Neutral 22526 17.9 18.6 24.5 
Agree 73852 58.6 61.1 85.6 
Strongly 
agree 17431 13.8 14.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 120865 95.9 100.0   
0 866 .7     
6 4327 3.4     
Missing 
Total 5193 4.1     








Total Yrs Aviation Maintenance 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  450 .4 .4 .4 
<1 15650 12.4 12.4 12.8 
1-2 29565 23.5 23.5 36.2 
11-15 10848 8.6 8.6 44.8 
16-20 10349 8.2 8.2 53.0 
20+ 3795 3.0 3.0 56.1 
3-5 37200 29.5 29.5 85.6 
6-10 18201 14.4 14.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 126058 100.0 100.0   
 
<1 1-2 11-15 16-20 20+ 3-5 6-10


















 Work Center 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  450 .4 .4 .4 
Airframes 17769 14.1 14.1 14.5 
Avionics 26988 21.4 21.4 35.9 
Flight Line 15724 12.5 12.5 48.3 
Maintenance 
Control 10660 8.5 8.5 56.8 
Ordnance 10215 8.1 8.1 64.9 
Other 17813 14.1 14.1 79.0 
Power Plants 12286 9.7 9.7 88.8 
QA 6648 5.3 5.3 94.0 
Survival 7505 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Valid 

































 Primary Shift 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  450 .4 .4 .4 
Day 86523 68.6 68.6 69.0 
Night 39085 31.0 31.0 100.0 
Valid 























 Current Model Aircraft 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
A4 142 .1 .1 .1 
AH-1 5241 4.2 4.2 4.3 
AV-8 6085 4.8 4.8 9.1 
C-12 32 .0 .0 9.1 
C-130 4211 3.3 3.3 12.5 
C-2 1350 1.1 1.1 13.5 
C-20 211 .2 .2 13.7 
C-26 10 .0 .0 13.7 
C-35 14 .0 .0 13.7 
C-37 13 .0 .0 13.7 
C-40 453 .4 .4 14.1 
C-9 1116 .9 .9 15.0 
E-2 5324 4.2 4.2 19.2 
E-6 1865 1.5 1.5 20.7 
EA-6 9725 7.7 7.7 28.4 
F-14 4049 3.2 3.2 31.6 
F-5 55 .0 .0 31.6 
FA-18 33309 26.4 26.4 58.1 
H-1 2302 1.8 1.8 59.9 
H-2 27 .0 .0 59.9 
H-3 1082 .9 .9 60.8 
H-46 6919 5.5 5.5 66.3 
H-53 7210 5.7 5.7 72.0 
H-60 14769 11.7 11.7 83.7 
P-3 14468 11.5 11.5 95.2 
PIONEE
R 574 .5 .5 95.6 
QF-4 8 .0 .0 95.6 
S-3 4905 3.9 3.9 99.5 
T-1 4 .0 .0 99.5 
T-2 2 .0 .0 99.5 
T-34 73 .1 .1 99.6 
T-39 1 .0 .0 99.6 
T-6 2 .0 .0 99.6 
TA-4 63 .0 .0 99.6 
TH-57 10 .0 .0 99.7 
V-22 434 .3 .3 100.0 
Valid 





















































  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 MAW 6364 5.0 5.0 5.0 
2 MAW 13083 10.4 10.4 15.4 
3 MAW 18570 14.7 14.7 30.2 
4 MAW 5155 4.1 4.1 34.2 
CMC 54 .0 .0 34.3 
CNAL 19035 15.1 15.1 49.4 
CNAP 26359 20.9 20.9 70.3 
CNARF 6375 5.1 5.1 75.4 
CNATRA 371 .3 .3 75.7 
CNO 281 .2 .2 75.9 
COMCAB 
EAST 358 .3 .3 76.2 
COMCAB 
WEST 241 .2 .2 76.4 
NAVAIR 20229 16.0 16.0 92.4 
Other 9583 7.6 7.6 100.0 
Valid 
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